Zhihui Wu,1– 3 Junyao Song,4 Xiyou Chen,1 Daoqun Ding,1– 3,5 Xiangyi Zhang1,6 

1Department of Psychology, School of Education Science, Hunan Normal University, Changsha, People’s Republic of China; 2Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies, Hunan Normal University, Changsha, People’s Republic of China; 3Center for Mind and Brain Science, Hunan Normal University, Changsha, People’s Republic of China; 4School of Psychology, Central China Normal University, Wuhan, People’s Republic of China; 5Research Base for Mental Health Education of Hunan Province, Changsha, People’s Republic of China; 6Cognition and Human Behavior Key Laboratory of Hunan Province, Hunan Normal University, Changsha, People’s Republic of China

Correspondence: Daoqun Ding; Xiangyi Zhang, Department of Psychology, School of Education Science, Hunan Normal University, 36 Lushan Road, Changsha, Hunan, 410081, People’s Republic of China, Email psychding@hunnu.edu.cn; xiangyizhang@hunnu.edu.cn

Purpose: Adverse childhood experiences (ACEs) have been associated with various aspects of morality, but their precise impact on moral decision-making remains unclear. This study aims to explore how ACEs influence moral decision-making in sacrificial dilemmas.
Methods: Study 1 employed traditional dilemma analysis to quantify utilitarian responses and compare them among groups with no, low, and high ACEs. Study 2 utilized the CNI model to quantify three determinants of moral decision-making: sensitivity to consequences (C parameter), sensitivity to norms (N parameter), and general action tendencies (I parameter). Differences in these parameters among groups with no, low, and high ACEs were investigated.
Results: Both Study 1 and Study 2 revealed that the high-ACE and low-ACE groups showed significantly higher utilitarian responses compared to the no-ACE group. However, no notable differences emerged between the high-ACE and low-ACE groups. Study 2 found that the N parameter was significantly lower in the high-ACE group compared to the low and no-ACE groups. Similarly, the low-ACE group exhibited significantly lower scores in the N parameter compared to the no-ACE group. Additionally, no significant differences were observed in the C and I parameters among groups with no, low, and high ACEs.
Conclusion: These findings suggest that individuals with a high number of ACEs tend to exhibit more utilitarian responses, attributed to decreased affective response to the violation of moral rules, rather than increased deliberative cost-benefit reasoning or a general preference for action. Such insights deepen our understanding of the precise aspects of moral decision-making influenced by ACEs.

Keywords: adverse childhood experiences, moral decision-making, CNI model